Deconstructing social constructs

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We humans love to classify things.  Classifications are a necessary part of organizing our perceptions: sometimes they are subjective, sometimes objective.  Yet even scientific classifications involve some arbitrary decisions, which may or may not be accepted by all.  For example, the decimal system is an arbitrary manner by which to organize numbers, but there are credible arguments that other systems would work better.  However, we typically accept most classifications of objects, or at least agree to disagree on specific grounds.

Matters of perception are more contentious to classify.  Where red merges into orange is one level of difficulty; where beautiful becomes ugly is more debatable.  The more subjective the perception, the more likely it is to be disputed.

People are not objects (or so we think).  So efforts to classify people into groups requires some objectification of persons.  In principle, this represents an immediate problem, especially if some groups or persons so classified have, or are perceived to have, different rights and privileges than others.  Even distinctions which we consider administrative can be perceived as unfair: age restrictions, for example, or those pertaining to rights of citizenship.  However, most accept that governments must make some classifications so that young children do not drive cars, or so that citizens of one country do not access the social programs of another.

Particularly in recent decades, (what we classify as) western societies have begun to challenge classifications of persons that result in one group of persons being treated differently from another.  The presumption for these challenges is that all human beings have certain basic human rights, irrespective of other aspects of their identity.  But the challenge is more profound than that.  Much contemporary thought challenges, if not entirely rejects, some systems of classification altogether.  For example, scientific classification by race is considered problematic and probably unsustainable; genetic differences are just too small.  Classification by gender is now so fluid as to verge on incoherence.  A similar difficulty exists with classifications by sexual orientation.

If classification by others is rejected or found unacceptable, then some argue that persons are entitled to self-classify: to determine, as examples, what race or gender they are.  One might respond that this appears to be a form of solipsism, with its inevitable consequences for coherence.  In any case, as noted below, self-classification does not necessarily imply acceptance of the classification by others.

Some thinkers and commentators have argued that a person’s identity provides them with particular rights over culture, language and thought, within the realm of their particular identity.  According to this view, those who do not share the particular characteristics of that identity do not have the moral right – and should not have the societal and political right – to comment on the practices and beliefs of that identity group.

This essay explores some implications of the chaos within classifications and the rise of identity culture.  It adopts as an axiom the proposition that all human being share basic human rights.

Race

Many assert that race is a social construct.  Indeed, in current circumstances to suggest that race is not a social construct is to license charges of racism. In this context, social construct means the method by which one person or group classifies another, whether based on skin colour, facial characteristics, geographical location, language, history, affluence, or technological and industrial, cultural or religious practices.  One society’s social constructs of another’s often tend to disparage characteristics unfamiliar to the society doing the constructing.  Instances of the opposite are rare.  How many other contemporary societies do we praise or idolise, as ones we should emulate?  Of course, we can develop complexes about the guilt of our own societies. In this paper, race is considered distinct from ethnicity; the latter is discussed in the section below on culture.

The practical implications of identification by race – regardless of the moral ones – are problematic.  Remember octoroons?  Today, residents of the United States are allowed to change their reported race in government reports.  In Canada, survey respondents are invited to self-identify as members of indigenous groups. In many cases, race is more than a social construct.  It becomes a personal construct.

One person’s self-designation of race may or may not be accepted by others.  But it is unclear whether anything other than a subjective identification is possible, given the lack of genetic clarity in classification and the fluidity of the designations of race.  Social group self-designation of race is subjective within the group, although defended vociferously.  For outsiders, it can seem quite peculiar to see African-Americans challenge the racial credentials of Africans from Africa.

Acceptance that one can self-identify as a member of a particular race would be harmless (though hardly meaningful) provided it implied no particular rights in society, or no special ways in which that person should be treated.  But that is not how it works in in relation to how a self-racialized person expects to be treated, or in societal or governmental practices.  Some racial groups, perceived to be disadvantaged, have preferred access to government programs or jobs so that a historical imbalance can be rectified.  People have changed their racial identification to improve job opportunities or access to government programs.  One high profile example was provided by a US Presidential candidate, Elizabeth Warren, who as an adult changed her reported race to American Indian.

Governments and employers have the right, and sometimes the obligation, to provide special services or opportunities to groups of persons considered to be disadvantaged.  However, in so doing it seems reasonable to allow governments and employers the concomitant right to determine who is eligible for those programs.  Self-identification of race would result in incoherence in government programming.

Gender

Gender is understood as distinct from biological sex designation.  Gender is understood as distinct from sexual orientation. Gender expression may or may not be different from biological sex or sexual orientation.  But these ‘understandings’ are relatively fresh phenomena, in the making for a few recent decades.  Various social platforms recognize more than 50 gender identitites.

In Canada, public policy identifies gender identity as each person’s personal experience of it.  It is then, by definition, a personal construct.  Societal, cultural and psychological factors would be influences, but gender identity is determined by the individual – evidently as a matter of personal choice.  It follows that gender expression – whether or how that identity is shown – is also a matter of choice.

It is understood that gender identity can change over time.  This can happen during adolescence, for example, or at a later time based on each person’s experience.  The long-term stability of gender identity is a key factor in determining whether a person should be allowed to make physical alterations in their biological gender; alterations which are likely to have some permanence.

Federal and Provincial laws protect the gender identity, gender expression and sexual orientation of all persons.  All forms of discrimination in employment or in access to services are contrary to law or policy.  Harassment on the basis of identity expression or orientation is not allowed.  In certain circumstances, refusal to recognize the selected gender of a person can be considered harassment.  The operative assumption, though, is that persons are entitled to respect regardless how they present themselves.

The fluidity of gender identity and expression poses challenges for a society accustomed to binary distinctions.  Although laws now protect alternate genders, granting rights to persons of non-binary or trans or no gender should not limit the rights of other persons.  This principle should be applied in attempting to resolve disputes over washrooms, changing rooms, employment, etc.  The essential point is protection of the basic human rights of all persons.

Culture

Virtually all aspects of human behaviour and accomplishment are included in the meaning of culture; it is an umbrella term, which includes religious beliefs.  Ethnicity is related to culture, not to race.  By definition culture is a social construct; individually it is a personal one.  As these are rather less contentious propositions than those suggesting that race or gender are constructs, let us move on.

Cultural tolerance is Canadian policy.  We seek to be a multi-cultural society, which means that distinctions should be fully respected, and often celebrated, between cultural groups.  The limits of cultural tolerance are strictly circumscribed, however, by protocols against cultural appropriation.  Moreover, social navigation around cultural differences can require steering between Scylla and Charybdis.

Interdictions against cultural appropriation can veer perilously close to incoherence.  If society is asked to accept that race and gender identity are fluid social constructs, i.e. that one can self-select racial and gender identity, that one can change those identities at will, then surely it follows that one can adopt and/or change a cultural identity.  In human history, cultural identity has always been more diverse, malleable and transportable than racial or gender identity.  Cultures have adopted behaviours, practices and accomplishments from other cultures for as long as there have been migrations of peoples and ideas.

Once again, the operative proposition should be that humans all share basic rights.  Actions such as discrimination, denigration or exploitation by one group against another limit or remove the rights of the other.  On this standard, cultural appropriation is defensible unless it:

• Denigrates another culture as inferior (e.g., for the purposes of mockery);
• Exploits an element of another culture for economic or personal gain;
• Uses cultural identifiers as the basis for discriminatory actions.

The conventional definition of appropriation suggests that it occurs when the economic or political system of one culture is dominant over another other.  But while this often happens, the definition is a distortion.  There are many cases where one smaller or more local culture resists the appropriation or adoption of another’s cultural practices, in the interests of preserving the integrity of the local culture.  For many years, some Southeast Asian societies resisted Western business attire, as an imposition.  Although it is more a case of cultural domination than appropriation, for more than 100 years Canadian government policy tried to force European cultural norms on indigenous peoples, a violation of human rights causing immense cultural and personal damage.

This general assessment leaves much room for debate about specific cases.  (Can a [self-identified] Caucasian operate a restaurant serving Chinese food? Can Yoga be taught by a non-Indian?)  If the debate revolves around acknowledgement and respect for the rights of others, it is likely to be a productive discussion although resolution is far from guaranteed!

Even without concerns about appropriation, the wisdom of Solomon and the patience of Job may be required when the rules of one culture conflict with the rules of another.  A synagogue in Montréal objected to the clear glass windows of a nearby YMCA, as young congregants could see scantily clad exercisers.  Parents in Toronto objected to a school board’s permission for voluntary Muslim prayer sessions.  The government of Ontario chose to limit the rights of assembly of anti-abortion protesters in order to protect a woman’s right to choose abortion.

It appears that most culture clashes result from people’s efforts to apply strongly held religious beliefs to those who do not share them.  Some argue that a more secular state will protect human rights against the requirements of religion.  Such reasoning appears to have been applied within Québec, where persons employed by the government and in positions of authority may not display any religious symbols on their persons.  This is a profoundly misguided decision, though popular.

The resolution to such clashes is not to take away people’s rights for religious or cultural expression, unless such practices conflict with basic human rights or Canadian criminal law.  It is far better simply to limit the imposition of religious or cultural practices to those of that particular religion or culture.  In other words, the beliefs of one religion or culture should not be imposed on those who do not share that religion or culture.

Identity

It should not be contentious that one person’s identity is that person’s basic human right.  So, persons should have the right to consider themselves as a member of whatever race, gender or culture they choose.  However, a person’s identity does not give them rights over any other person or social practice.  This second proposition is more contentious, as there are those who argue that an individual’s identity must be respected in all social interactions.

What is called identity politics founders on the question of equal human rights. (I would argue that identity politics founders in other areas, but that is a separate discussion.)  The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to the “inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family [emphasis added]”.  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifies that everyone has fundamental freedoms “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.  Both the Declaration and the Charter emphasize that rights apply equally to everyone.  The Charter takes a more practical view on the limitations on rights, important to this discussion.

Within this framework, a person has the right to express views that reflect their race or gender or culture identity.  They have the right to engage in racial, gender or cultural practices associated with their identity.  But those rights are limited.  They have no concomitant right to expect others to agree with or to adopt their views or practices.  As well, their views and practices are subject to the laws of the land: ‘demonstrably justified limits in law’.

We can accept that there has been, and often still is, systemic and particular discrimination against racial, gender and cultural groups.  Such discrimination is well documented and should be addressed.  It is also appropriate to hear and attempt to understand the experience of the discrimination from the perspective of the person who faced it.  However, efforts to address the issues should be directed to improving the state of those disadvantaged rather than weakening the state of the advantaged.

‘Equal human rights for all’ presupposes some common ground on basic concepts among individuals and/or groups of persons.  Obviously it requires agreement on what are basic human rights.  But prior to that it requires a common ground on concepts of communication, logic and argument.  One cannot have a coherent exchange with a person who argues that something both is and is not at the same time (let us leave aside the question of coherence among quantum physicists).  Equally, one cannot have a coherent debate with someone who willing to offer neither argument nor evidence.

One can indeed insist on one’s personal truth, or on the truth of the experience of a particular race, gender or cultural group.  But those truths are subjectively true only.  The criteria for more broadly societally-shared truth, although that truth might still be subjective, nonetheless demand coherent arguments with factual support. Criteria for what would be called objective truth are yet more demanding: adherence to logic, verifiable evidence, adherence to precedent, in principle falsifiability.

Those who insist that their subjective truth be acknowledged on its own merits are engaging in the same kind of cultural and epistemological imperialism they claim to suffer from themselves.  It is typically asserted as an axiom, which is the best that can be done with a form of solipsism.

Conclusions

• Self-identification or one’s race, gender or culture seems to have been accepted in society, although its fluidity challenges any coherent framework of classification.
• To the extent that the rights of others are not affected, all persons should be allowed full expression of their race, gender or culture.
• The subjective truth of one’s racial, gender identity or cultural experience should be accepted as objective in society only to the extent that it meets common standards for communication, such as evidence and logic.